JUNE 4, 2024 – The battle of Midway Island, a Hawaiian archipelago, roughly one-third of the way from Honolulu to Tokyo, Japan, pitted two naval strategic masterminds against each other and the results of the battle marked the turning point in not only the war against Japan in the Pacific; but also, a major boost for US forces morale across both theaters during World War II. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was commanded by Marshal Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippine Islands. The United States Pacific Theatre was commanded by Admiral Chester Nimitz who, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, was in command of the Bureau of Navigation (modern day Personnel Command).
The American and Japanese forces who would meet in battle were unevenly matched on paper. The IJN boasted better airplanes, battle tested pilots, and a combined fleet which included four fleet carriers with more experience maneuvering together. The U.S. Navy featured young, un-tested pilots, older and less maneuverable aircraft, and a smaller attacking force comprised of only three aircraft carriers.
In terms of strategy, Admiral Yamamoto had devised an ambitious and complex plan of attack involving a diversion to the Aleutian Islands south of Alaska. While the diversion was underway, the First Carrier Attacking Force would lead the attack on Midway Island to clear any American air patrols, take out any patrolling surface vessels, and bomb the airfields to reduce any resistance to the Japanese landing forces. The amphibious landings would commence a day or two later by the Midway Invasion Force, supported by Japan’s Second Fleet. Japan’s strategy intended for the American carriers to take the Aleutian Islands bait, and move north toward Alaska, and then circle back once the attack on Midway started, where the Japanese planned to ambush the returning U.S. Fleet.
On the contrary, Admiral Nimitz’s strategy, was straight forward: find the enemy and sink them, or at minimum, prevent the capture of Midway. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, the U.S. Navy had one distinct advantage, discovered earlier that year, where cryptanalysts at Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (Station HYPO) and Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne, finally broke the JN-25 naval codes, which, thanks to increased Japanese radio activity, they were able to actively predict IJN operations and exercises.
Station HYPO was commanded by Commander Joseph Rochefort, who was an expert Japanese linguist and cryptanalyst. Rochefort hand selected most of Station HYPO’s cryptanalysts, where the valued message traffic analysts and linguists maintained a close working relationship with Lt. Cmdr. Edwin Layton, Admiral Nimitz’s chief intelligence officer. They also incorporated Navy band members, operating on the theory they would be good at deciphering patterns, due to their musical talents. The Sailors at Station HYPO worked around the clock to decode messages and in the process, honed in on the letters “AF,” which they concluded was the code for Midway. To test this theory, they sent a false distress signal from Midway “damage to water supply” which was picked up and repeated by the Japanese and decoded as “water shortage at AF”.
With this information in hand, the cryptanalysts at Station HYPO were able to focus their efforts on mapping out the date and time of Japan’s planned Midway attack. In the process, they also decoded the Japanese diversion towards the Aleutian Islands was just that, a diversion. With this information, Admiral Nimitz was able to add the element of surprise to his strategy, utilizing the intelligence gathered by Rochefort and Station HYPO, placing his carriers in position to attack the unsuspecting Japanese carriers.
On June 4, 1942, at 0600, reports came to Pearl Harbor from Midway that read: “Plane reports two carriers and Main Body ships bearing 320, course 135, speed 25, distance 180.” Upon hearing the news, Nimitz said to his chief intelligence officer, Lt. Cmdr. Edwin Layton, “Well, you were only five miles, five degrees, and five minutes off.” The trap was sprung and the battle of Midway had started.
Over the course of June 4, intense fighting occurred over the seas around Midway. Planes from both carrier strike groups attacked, recovered, and attacked again. Both sides took heavy casualties, especially Japan’s carriers, which, at the onset of the attacks, had their aircraft configured for bombing runs on the island of Midway, vice outfitting with torpedoes for attacking ships at sea. As the Japanese carriers scrambled to reconfigure their fighters and bombers, much of the ordnance was improperly stowed, a recipe for disaster as waves of U.S. Navy SBD-3 Dauntless dive-bombers wreaked havoc on multiple IJN carriers. Unfortunately, the U.S. Navy lost a lot of aircraft too, including the U.S. Torpedo Squadron (VT) 8, which lost all but two pilots and radiomen. When the fighting finally subsided and both navies broke contact, Midway Island remained in American control. The U.S. lost the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV 5), one destroyer, and roughly 150 aircraft. The IJN lost all four attacking fleet carriers (Kaga, Soryu, Akagi, and Hiryu), one heavy cruiser, and roughly 248 planes. While much of the fighting occurred on June 4, historians mark June 7 as the final day of the battle, as that is when efforts to save Yorktown were abandoned, and she sank.
The battle of Midway was a major strategic victory for the U.S. Navy, changing the course of the war in the Pacific, an overwhelming boost to U.S. forces morale, and paved the way forward for our ultimate victory in the Pacific theatre, just a few years later Admiral Nimitz’s simple, yet direct strategy, coupled with superior intelligence, proved to be the precise combination needed for victory. He would later command all naval forces in the Pacific and was present at the signing of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender on September 2, 1945. Admiral Yamamoto was killed April 18, 1943 when his plane was shot down during Operation Vengeance, which just so happened to be another carefully devised Station HYPO-led successful plan.
Story by Chief Petty Officer Jason Graham
PCU JOHN F. KENNEDY