APRIL 23, 2026 — Airpower works best when leaders can make sound decisions faster than the other side. That hasn’t changed. What has changed is how quickly those decisions have to be made and how little room there is to adjust once things are in motion. Air University exists to help build that edge for the Joint Force, and the events of 1898 show how those moments tend to take shape.
The United States did not go to war because of a single explosion in Havana Harbor. The destruction of the USS Maine took away any remaining time, but it did not create the decision. Public pressure had already been building. Options were narrowing. Leaders were moving toward action. As Robert Clemm, professor of national security studies at Air University’s Air Force Global College, explained during a recent lesson, “the loss of the ship… was built up by the press as simply a further example of Spanish barbarism,” contributing to a shift in public sentiment that accelerated the path to war. He added that the moment became “less about what actually happened and more about how it was understood at the time.” The cause of the explosion remains debated. The outcome does not.
Cuba had been unstable for years. Spain was working to maintain control of one of its remaining colonies while facing a persistent independence movement. At the same time, U.S. economic ties to the island continued to grow, increasing the stakes. Reporting from the region shaped how the situation was understood, often faster than it could be confirmed. As Clemm explained, “you have a situation where economic interest, political pressure and public sentiment are all moving in the same direction.” Those conditions came together before the first major engagement.
Clemm described the conflict as “a seminal moment for the history of the Western Hemisphere,” marking “the entry of the United States as a force on the global stage.” He noted that this shift “did not begin with military dominance, but with a change in how the United States saw its role.” That change did not begin with combat operations. It began with how the situation developed and how it was interpreted.
By the time senior leaders acted, the decision space had already narrowed. The problem had been framed. The risks were understood in a certain way. The range of options was limited. As Clemm put it, “once that perception sets in, it becomes very difficult to move the decision in another direction.” The explosion did not introduce urgency. It confirmed it.
Military operations reflected both preparation and shortfall. The U.S. Navy entered the conflict ready and quickly established control at sea. On land, forces advanced under more difficult conditions. Clemm noted the Army operated with “no system of effective mobilization… no accurate maps… and very few modern weapons.” He added that “success came, but it came with friction that could have been avoided.” Units adapted and continued forward, but the gap between intent and readiness was visible.
That relationship still matters. The pace is faster now and the environment is more complex, but the link between what leaders intend to do and what forces are prepared to do remains the same. If those don’t align early, the gap appears at the point of action. As Clemm explained, “you don’t get to build capability once the decision has been made. You bring what you have.”
The most significant decisions in 1898 were made before the fighting. Cuban resistance created instability. Spanish actions influenced perception. U.S. economic interests increased the stakes. Clemm explained that these dynamics allowed Cuban actors to “draw in and rally U.S. public opinion,” bringing different pressures together. He noted that “by the time the United States entered the conflict, there were very few off-ramps left.” The direction had already been set.
Lessons like this, delivered in Air University classrooms, are part of how the institution builds decision advantage. They give students a chance to examine how conditions develop, how pressure shapes outcomes and how decisions take form before they reach senior leaders. That learning feeds directly into Air University’s broader mission to forge expert joint warfighters and solve operational problems for the Joint Force while operating as an integrated enterprise.
The outcome of the war extended beyond battlefield success. The United States remained engaged in Cuba and expanded its role across the region. As Clemm observed, what the United States viewed as stabilizing actions was often seen by others as “Yankee imperialism,” highlighting how perception can shape long-term effects. He noted that “those perceptions don’t fade quickly. They carry forward.”
Today’s environment moves faster and is more connected, but the pattern is familiar. Conditions develop over time. Pressure builds. Options narrow. Decisions follow. As Clemm summarized, “the decision is usually made before it’s made official.”
Air University’s role is to prepare leaders before that moment arrives.
Story by Billy Blankenship
Air University Public Affairs